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Abstract 
People tend to underestimate the time it takes to accomplish tasks.  This bias known 
as the planning fallacy derives from the tendency to focus attention too narrowly on 
the envisaged goal and to ignore additional information that could make predictions 
more accurate and less biased.  Drawing on recent research showing that power 
induces attentional focus, four studies tested the hypothesis that power strengthens the 
tendency to underestimate future task completion time.  Across a range of task 
domains, and using multiple operationalizations of power, including actual control 
over outcomes (Study 1), priming (Studies 2 and 3), and individual differences (Study 
4), power consistently led to more optimistic and less accurate time predictions.  
Support was found for the role of attentional focus as an underlying mechanism for 
those effects.  Differences in optimism, self-efficacy, and mood did not contribute to 
the greater bias in powerful individuals’ forecasts.  We discuss the implications of 
these findings for institutional decision processes and occupational health.   
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How Long Will It Take? 
Power Biases Time Predictions 
Time is a crucial factor in people’s everyday lives.   Business executives, 
policy makers, engineers, nurses, teachers or students routinely plan their work and 
estimate the time it will take to accomplish tasks.  Psychological research shows that 
these estimates are systematically biased, and people tend to underestimate the time it 
takes to accomplish tasks.  Biased time predictions are a widespread phenomenon that 
affects mundane everyday activities as well as large-scale business projects (e.g., 
Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 1994; Hall, 1980; Schnaars, 1989).  Unreliable time 
predictions have attracted a great deal of public attention and are commonly known as 
the planning fallacy (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Considering the practical relevance and common interest, relatively little is 
known about the factors that alter biases in time predictions.  Interventions to reduce 
the planning fallacy have had limited success overall (e.g., Byram, 1997; see Roy, 
Christenfeld, & McKenzie, 2005, for a review).  The present research extends past 
research by focusing on the way the wider social context affects time predictions.  In 
particular, we suggest that being in a position of power strengthens the tendency to 
underestimate future task completion time.  Our proposal derives from recent research 
indicating that power promotes a goal-directed attentional focus (e.g., Guinote, 
2007a), and from the observation that biases in time predictions originate from a too 
narrow focus on the envisaged goal.   
Attentional Focus and Biased Time Predictions   
Biased estimates of time originate from the ways individuals process 
information (e.g., Newby-Clark, Ross, Buehler, Koehler, & Griffin, 2000; Buehler & 
Griffin, 2003; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993).  Specifically, individuals tend to focus 
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attention too narrowly on the event in question and disregard additional information 
that could make predictions more accurate and less optimistic.  Below, we discuss 
three sources of information that are commonly neglected. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggested that when people plan the future 
they adopt an ‘inside view’ that overemphasizes the uniqueness of a target event.  By 
ignoring the distribution of similar events people fail to consider how long similar 
tasks usually take (see also Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993).  Later research confirmed 
that people are reluctant to consider past experiences in their planning, and this makes 
them prone to bias in their forecasts (Buehler et al., 1994; Buehler & Griffin, 2003).  
Underestimates of time also derive from the failure to take contingencies 
sufficiently into account (e.g., Buehler et al., 1994).  Future plans often resemble best-
case-scenarios and people tend to focus on the ways they can successfully accomplish 
their goals (e.g., Newby-Clark et al., 2000). By ignoring alternative ways how the 
future may unfold people are prone to misjudge impediments (e.g., Griffin, Dunning, 
& Ross, 1990); a bias which sharply increases with the number of potential setbacks 
(Bar-Hillel, 1973). 
Finally, people also tend to focus too heavily on a global representation of the 
task at hand.  As a result, they may not consider all subcomponents that a task affords 
(Kruger & Evans, 2004; see also Fischhoff, Slovis, & Lichtenstein, 1987).  Task 
subcomponents that are less evident are especially at risk of being ignored (cf. Kruger 
& Evans, 2004).  Consistent with this reasoning, unpacking tasks into subcomponents 
can decrease the tendency to underestimate task completion time (Kruger & Evans, 
2004), and focusing attention on the intended outcome increases bias (e.g., Taylor, 
Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998).   
Power and Time Predictions  5 
 
In sum, biases in time predictions operate through attentional mechanisms.  
People tend to focus too narrowly on the event in question and do not consider 
sufficiently additional information that could make predictions more accurate.  The 
more people focus on the intended outcome, the more they are prone to bias in their 
forecasts.  Factors that alter people’s attentional focus can, therefore, strengthen or 
alleviate the tendency to underestimate time.  For example, enhancing people’s goal-
focus by means of instructions (Buehler & Griffin, 2003), or incentives (Buehler, 
Griffin, & MacDonald, 1997; Byram, 1997) renders time predictions less accurate. 
One social variable that has a profound impact on goal-directed attentional 
focus is social power – the ability to influence and control others’ outcomes and 
resources (see Fiske & Berdahl, 2007).  As discussed next, individuals in power 
display a processing orientation that should make them more prone to bias in 
predictions of task completion time. 
Power Affects Goal-Directed Attention 
At the basic cognitive level, power fosters selective attention, enhancing the 
processing of task relevant information and leading to the inhibition of secondary 
information (Guinote, 2007b).  Consequently, powerful individuals typically display a 
more simplified, narrow focus of attention consistent with activated constructs (e.g., 
goals, needs, affordances), whereas powerless individuals pay less attention to 
primary constructs and attend more to secondary information (see Guinote, 2007a, for 
a review of the Situated Focus Theory of Power).     
When goals are activated, powerful individuals pay more attention to 
information that pertains to their focal goal, and less attention to secondary 
information as compared to powerless individuals (Guinote, 2007b, 2007c; see also 
Overbeck & Park, 2001; Slabu & Guinote, in press).  For instance, research on social 
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perception shows that powerful individuals focus more unequivocally on stereotypic, 
or on individuating information depending on their current goals (Overbeck & Park, 
2001) and influence strategies (Vescio, Snyder, & Butz, 2003).  In contrast, powerless 
individuals show less clear prioritizations between these different sources of 
information.   
Power also fosters an approach-related motivational orientation (see Keltner, 
Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003, for a review of the Approach/Inhibition Theory of 
Power).  As a result, powerful individuals are more oriented towards achieving gains 
and rewards, and less apprehensive about avoiding threats or constraints as compared 
to powerless individuals (see also Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, & 
Liljenquist, 2008).  Power thus magnifies people’s focus on desired outcomes and 
reduces the tendency to consider potential setbacks and threats to successful goal 
attainment.      
The propensity to achieve rewarding outcomes facilitates action (Galinsky, 
Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Keltner et al., 2003; see also Guinote, Judd, & Brauer, 
2002), and powerful individuals benefit from their greater focus during goal striving 
(Guinote, 2007c).  However, little is known about how power affects the planning of 
future tasks.  The same cognitive orientation that benefits goal-striving should 
ironically create conditions for stronger biases in time predictions.   
Powerful individuals’ greater focus on single sources of information facilitates 
an ‘inside view’ (Kahneman &  Lovallo, 1993) and reduces the likelihood that 
powerful individuals will consider distributional information in their forecasts.  As a 
result, powerful individuals are more likely to ignore the duration of similar events 
that have taken place in the past.  By the same token powerful individuals are less 
likely to consider multiple alternatives in their future plans, and therefore are less 
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prone to recognize potential setbacks and interfering events (cf. Buehler, Griffin, & 
Ross, 2002; Griffin et al., 1990; Hoch, 1985).  Due to their greater focus on primary 
sources of information, powerful individuals may also fail to consider task 
subcomponents that are not readily apparent.  The greater approach-motivation of 
powerful individuals further contributes to the neglect of threatening and impeding 
information, and it makes powerful individuals more oriented towards task outcomes 
in detriment of task subcomponents (cf. Keltner et al., 2003).  
  Differences in attentional focus may not be the only reason why powerful 
individuals are prone to underestimate time.  Powerful individuals might dismiss 
impediments or threats because they are generally more optimistic about the future 
(Anderson & Galinsky, 2006).  Powerful individuals might also have greater 
confidence in their abilities to overcome impediments and to complete tasks 
successfully (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006).  Such differences in self-efficacy beliefs 
(Bandura, 1982) could lead to greater bias in forecasts (cf. Hinds, 1999).   Lastly, 
power can promote positive affect (Keltner et al., 2003; Wojciszke & Struzynska-
Kujalowicz, 2007), which could induce more optimistic estimates of future task 
completion time.   
The prospect that optimism contributes to greater bias in the time predictions 
of powerful individuals is, however, dampened by past research that failed to find an 
association between optimism and temporal bias (Buehler & Griffin, 2003; Jørgensen 
& Faugli, 2006).  Likewise, empirical evidence is lacking that confirms the link 
between mood and biased time predictions.  Finally, past research on power and 
decision making found that elevated self-efficacy beliefs do not necessarily lead to 
more optimistic decisions in powerholders (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). Taken 
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together, differences in optimism, self-efficacy, and mood might be less influential in 
promoting greater bias in the time predictions of powerful individuals. 
The Present Research 
The present article tests the hypothesis that power increases the tendency to 
underestimate task completion time.  We suggest this to be the case because power 
affects attention in ways that promote biased time predictions.  Specifically, power 
induces a goal-directed attentional focus and the tendency to disregard additional 
information that lies outside the focal goal.  Powerful individuals are, therefore, less 
likely to consider information that could make predictions more accurate and less 
biased (i.e., impediments, task subcomponents, and past experiences).   
Previous research has shown that biases in time predictions arise through the 
ways people allocate attention in the planning of future events.  This led us to posit 
that attentional focus is a key mechanism through which power fosters greater bias in 
forecasts.  At the same time, we also examined the role of optimism, self-efficacy, and 
mood as additional pathways through which power may affect time predictions. 
We conducted four studies to test the hypothesis that power increases bias in 
predictions of task completion time.  Studies 1 and 4 compared predicted and actual 
completion time of students’ coursework projects, Study 2 examined biased time 
predictions in a computerized formatting task, and Study 3 focused on time estimates 
for everyday activities.  One study examined attentional focus as underlying 
mechanism for the effects of power (Study 3), two studies examined self-efficacy 
(Studies 2 and 4) and mood (Studies 3 and 4), and one study explored the role of 
optimism (Study 4).  Power was operationalized using different experimental 
manipulations (Studies 1-3) and an individual difference measure (Study 4). 
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Study 1 
In the present study, students estimated the time it would take them to 
complete an important coursework assignment.  The study was conducted 
longitudinally, and estimates (time 1) were compared against actual completion time 
(time 2).  Power was manipulated at time 1 by having half of the participants believe 
their opinion would have important consequences for others, placing them in a 
position of control over others’ outcomes (see Fiske & Dépret, 1996).  As part of an 
ostensibly unrelated task, participants then predicted the completion time of their 
assignment.  If powerful participants focused more on the envisaged goal (i.e., 
completion of the coursework) at the expense of considering additional information 
such as impediments or past experiences, then they should anticipate an earlier 
completion time than participants who did not have power.  This should lead to a 
greater discrepancy between actual and predicted completion times for powerful 
individuals compared to individuals who did not have power.   
Method 
Participants and Design 
Twenty students (11 females and 9 males) from the University of Kent 
participated on a voluntary basis.  They were randomly assigned to the experimental 
conditions (powerful vs. control).   
Procedure and Materials 
Participants were approached on a university campus and were invited to take 
part in a study focusing on student-life perception.  Power was manipulated using a 
procedure adopted from Goodwin and Fiske (1995; cited in Fiske & Dépret, 1996), 
such that half of the participants believed they controlled the outcomes of other 
students.  Specifically, participants learned about alleged plans of the University to 
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introduce a university-wide course credit scheme that would make it compulsory for 
future students across all disciplines to participate in Psychology projects.  
Participants in the powerful condition were informed that their opinions received a 
fixed weight of 50% towards the final decision of the University.  In contrast, 
participants in the control condition were told that the University was interested in 
their opinions, but these would not affect the future introduction of the scheme.   
As part of a purportedly unrelated task, participants then indicated the deadline 
for their next coursework assignment.  They also rated how important they considered 
their assignment (1=not at all, 9=very much).  Subsequently, participants estimated 
when they expected to finish (a) a first draft of their assignment, (b) the final version, 
and (c) when they expected to submit their assignment.  Actual completion time was 
assessed two weeks later over the telephone.   
Results and Discussion 
Predicted and actual completion times were coded in number of days before 
the official deadline (see Table 1).  Higher values indicate an earlier point in time 
compared to the deadline.  The completion times for a first draft and a final version 
were more strongly associated with each other than with the completion times for 
submission (rs(18) ≥ .83, ps < .001 vs. rs(18) ≤ .54, ps ≥ .015), giving rise to 
sphericity.  Where appropriate, the subsequent results are corrected for these 
differential associations using the Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon correction (e.g., 
Stevens, 1986).  We submitted participants’ predicted and actual completion times to 
a 2 (power: powerful vs. control) x 2 (time: predicted vs. actual completion time) x 3 
(task: first draft vs. final version vs. submission) mixed model analysis of variance 
with repeated measurement on the last two factors.  The analysis revealed a main 
effect of time, suggesting that participants’ estimates were biased, F(1, 18) = 100.92, 
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p < .001, ηp2 = .85.  On average, participants took two days longer to complete their 
assignments than originally anticipated (Ms = 3.82 vs. 1.88 days).  Of particular 
importance, a significant interaction between power and time emerged, F(1, 18) = 
7.68, p = .013, ηp2 = .30.  As can be seen in Table 2, powerful participants showed a 
greater discrepancy between their predicted and actual completion times than control 
participants (powerful: Ms = 4.93 vs. 2.47 days; control: Ms
 
= 2.70 vs. 1.30 days).  
Confirming our predictions, power led to greater underestimates of time.  Further tests 
of simple effects confirmed that this bias derived from differences in participants’ 
predictions.  While power also led participants to complete their projects earlier (t(18) 
= 3.99, p = .001, d = 1.88), the predictions of participants in power were nevertheless 
further off and much more optimistic than the predictions of participants who did not 
have power, t(18) = 4.78,  p < .001, d = 2.25.  Overall, powerful participants erred 
76% more in their predictions than control participants (Mspredicted vs. actual time  = 2.46 vs. 
1.4 days), t(18) = 2.77, p = .013, d = 1.31.   
A number of additional effects emerged from the analysis.  A significant 
interaction between task and time indicated that underestimates of task completion 
time were more pronounced for earlier tasks (first draft, final draft) than for later tasks 
(submission), F(2, 36) = 60.03, p < .001.  A main effect of task confirmed that 
completion times differed between the three tasks, F(2, 18) = 158.22, p < .001, ε = 
.654.  There was also a main effect of power (F(1, 18) = 24.93, p < .001), qualified by 
an interaction with task (F(2, 18) = 13.08, p = .001, ε = .654), suggesting that 
completion times were overall swifter for powerful than for control participants, but 
only for earlier tasks (first draft, final draft).  The three-way interaction between 
power, time, and task was not significant (p = .154), indicating that the effects of 
power on biased time predictions did not differ between the three tasks.  
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An examination of participants’ ratings of task importance revealed that 
powerful and control participants considered their assignment equally important (Ms 
= 7.00 vs. 6.70), t(18) < 1.   
The results of Study 1 provided support for the hypothesis that power induces 
biased predictions of time.  Powerful participants were less accurate and tended to 
underestimate more the time it would take them to complete a future assignment 
compared to participants who did not have power.   
Consistent with past research on goal pursuit (Guinote, 2007c) and action 
facilitation (Galinsky et al., 2003), powerful participants also completed some parts of 
their assignments earlier than control participants.  It is noteworthy that these effects 
emerged several days after the manipulation of power at time 1.   
One limitation of the present study is that we did not control for differences in 
the content of participants’ assignments.  It is possible that powerful participants 
chose more complex assignments than control participants, and such differences in 
task complexity could potentially account for the observed differences in time 
predictions (cf. Roy et al., 2005).  Our next study thus controlled for differences in 
task content.   
Study 2 
In the present study, all participants performed the same computerized task, 
using a common word editing software (Kruger & Evans, 2004).  Participants 
received an unformatted text and their task was to amend the formatting of the text to 
make it look like a template provided (see Figure 1).  This procedure allowed for 
predicted and actual completion times to be recorded within the same experimental 
session.   
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We manipulated power using an episodic priming procedure.  Following 
Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and Magee (2003), participants recalled a past event in which 
they were either in a position of power, or in a position of powerlessness.  Through 
the activation of affective, cognitive, and behavioral response repertoires associated 
with states of power or powerlessness, this procedure affords an examination of the 
effects of power in situations in which power is not directly experienced (cf. Galinsky 
et al., 2003).  We hypothesized that participants primed with power would show a 
greater bias in their time predictions than participants primed with powerlessness.  
The present study explored the role of self-efficacy beliefs in promoting 
greater bias in powerful individuals’ forecasts.  As noted earlier, power could lead to 
less accurate time predictions because powerful individuals have greater confidence in 
their abilities to accomplish tasks (cf. Hinds, 1999).  To address this conjecture, 
participants indicated how capable they were of formatting texts (cf. Bandura, 1982).   
Method 
Participants and Design 
Forty students (27 females and 13 males) from the University of Kent 
participated in exchange for chocolate bars.  Participants were randomly assigned to 
the experimental power conditions (powerful vs. powerless).   
Procedure and Materials 
Participants were informed that they would take part in a study on episodic 
memory, and in a separate study focusing on visual perception.  At the beginning, 
participants were asked to provide a vivid written report of a past situation where they 
had power over another individual, or where someone else had power over them 
(Galinsky et al., 2003).   
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Subsequently, participants were asked to format a document using a standard 
word editing software (Kruger & Evans, 2004).  Participants received three dictionary 
definitions as templates.  As shown in Figure 1, the task required putting unformatted 
text in bold, italics, uppercase, lowercase, as well as to insert punctuations, symbols, 
brackets, and spaces.   
Before participants began the formatting task, they filled in a measure of self-
efficacy, asking them to indicate how skilled they were in formatting texts on a scale 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much).1  A female experimenter, who was 
unaware of the experimental conditions, prompted participants for an estimate of how 
long it would take them to make all the formatting changes.  Unbeknownst to 
participants, estimates were recorded, and actual completion time was measured using 
a stopwatch.  After completion, participants were thanked, probed for suspicion, and 
debriefed. 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Check 
Participants indicated how much they felt in charge in the situation they 
described in their essays (1=not at all, 9=very much).  Participants in the powerful 
condition felt more in charge than did participants in the powerless condition (Ms = 
6.50 vs. 4.05), t(38) = 3.47, p = .001, d = 1.12, indicating that the manipulation was 
successful in prompting the recall of past episodes in which participants felt powerful 
or powerless. 
Task Completion Time 
Two participants were identified as outliers (>3 x SD) and removed from 
subsequent analyses.  We subjected the two measures of predicted and actual 
completion time to a 2 (power: powerful vs. powerless) x 2 (time: predicted vs. actual 
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completion time) mixed model analysis of variance with repeated measurement on the 
last factor.   The analysis yielded the expected main effect of time, F(1, 36) = 107.83,  
p < .001, ηp2 = .75.  Participants took considerably longer to complete the formatting 
task than they had predicted (Ms = 5.13 vs. 9.02 min).  Of special importance, a 
significant interaction between power and time emerged, F(1, 36) = 8.22, p = .007, 
ηp
2
 = .19 (see Table 2).  As expected, participants primed with power showed a 
greater discrepancy between their forecasts and their actual completion time than 
participants primed with powerlessness (powerful: Ms = 3.95 vs. 8.91 min; powerless: 
Ms
 
= 6.32 vs. 9.13 min).  An examination of simple effects revealed that, while power 
did not alter participants’ actual completion time (t(36) < 1),  it led to shorter time 
predictions, t(36) = 4.70, p < .001, d = 1.57.  Paralleling the findings of Study 1, 
power fostered greater bias in predictions of task completion time.  Overall, 
participants primed with power erred 77% more in their predictions than participants 
primed with powerlessness (Mspredicted vs. actual time = 4.96 vs. 2.81 min), t(36) = 2.87, p = 
.007, d = .96.   
We subsequently examined the contributions of self-efficacy to the effects of 
power.2  Priming power did not alter participants’ self-efficacy beliefs (Ms = 5.68 vs. 
5.16), F < 1.  Inclusion of self-efficacy as a covariate in the mixed model analysis of 
variance described above also did not alter the effects of power; the interaction 
between power and time remained unchanged (F(1, 35) = 7.40, p = .010), and none of 
the effects involving self-efficacy were significant, ps ≥ .271.  The effects of power 
on biased time predictions appear, therefore, to be unrelated to differences in self-
efficacy beliefs.   
The results showed that powerful participants did not complete the formatting 
task earlier than powerless participants.  This contrasts with previous research, which 
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has found that power facilitates action and can lead to earlier goal-attainment 
(Galinsky et al., 2003; Guinote, 2007c).  Consequently, we also examined 
participants’ performance in terms of number of mistakes made.  There was no 
difference between the experimental conditions (Ms = 16.20 vs. 13.55; F < 1), 
suggesting that in the present study power did not lead to differences in actual 
performance.   
Studies 1 and 2 support the hypothesis that power fosters biases in estimates of 
task completion time.  Across studies, power was associated with greater error in 
forecasts.  These effects emerged in different task domains and could not be attributed 
to differences in self-efficacy beliefs.  
The findings of Studies 1 and 2 are consistent with the notion that powerful 
individuals focus too narrowly on the anticipated outcome and do not consider 
sufficiently information that can potentially debias predictions.  In the next study, we 
examined more directly the role of attentional focus as an underlying mechanism for 
the effects of power.  
Study 3 
The goal of the present study was to provide evidence for the role of 
attentional focus in promoting differences in the time estimates of powerful and 
powerless individuals.  To this end, we employed an experimental approach in which 
we manipulated attentional focus.  If the greater bias in the time predictions of 
powerful individuals derives from a narrow focus of attention on the goal at hand, 
then drawing attention to additional information that has a bearing on task completion 
time should render the forecasts of powerful individuals less optimistic.  Importantly, 
no such effect should be observed for powerless individuals, who naturally attend to 
information that lies outside the focal goal.  In more generic terms, by manipulating 
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the pathway between power and attention (the proposed mediator), we expected to 
observe corresponding changes in the relationship between power and time estimates 
(the outcome variable).  This would be a first indication for a mediating role of 
attentional focus (see Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). 
The present study focused on predictions of completion time for everyday 
activities.  Attentional focus was manipulated by drawing attention to relevant past 
experiences in half of the participants.  As noted earlier, taking into account previous 
experiences can render time predictions more accurate and less optimistic.  We 
expected that power would lead to more optimistic predictions, but this effect would 
diminish when participants’ attention is drawn to relevant previous experiences.  We 
also assessed mood to see if differences in participants’ affective states contributed to 
the effects of power on time predictions.   
Method 
Participants and Design 
Sixty-four students (30 females, 32 males, and 2 unknown genders) from the 
University of Kent participated in exchange for chocolate bars.  They were randomly 
assigned to the conditions of a 2 (power: powerful vs. powerless) x 2 (attentional 
focus: past vs. control) between-subjects factorial design.   
Procedure and Materials 
Participants were informed that they would take part in a study dealing with 
people’s perceptions of social situations, and a study dealing with the planning of 
future events.  Power was manipulated using the same episodic priming manipulation 
employed in Study 2.  As part of an alleged separate study, participants were then 
instructed to imagine themselves in four hypothetical scenarios that involved the 
completion of future tasks.  Specifically, participants imagined they had to write a 
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2000-word essay, to get ready for an evening out, to shop in the supermarket, and to 
prepare a three-course meal.  For each scenario, participants could choose one of 
several response alternatives to indicate their anticipated completion time.  For ‘essay 
writing’, response alternatives varied from 1 to 14 days in 1-day incremental steps; for 
‘getting ready to go out’ and ‘supermarket shopping’, response alternatives ranged 
from 15 min to 4 h in steps of 15 min; and for ‘preparing a three-course meal’, the 
responses ranged from 30 min to 6 hs in incremental steps of 30 min.3  Participants 
were instructed to imagine themselves having to perform the four tasks.  To 
manipulate attentional focus, half of the participants were instructed to recall how 
much time it had taken them in the past to complete the tasks described in the 
scenarios.  Following Buehler and colleagues (1994), they were also asked to write a 
short description of how they were going to perform the tasks in the future 
considering their previous experiences.  This manipulation was designed to draw 
participants’ attention to previous experiences that were relevant for completing their 
goals (cf. Buehler et al., 1994).  Upon completion, all participants estimated the task 
completion times for the four tasks by choosing one of the response alternatives.  
Participants also rated their current mood on four 7-point scales, ranging from -3 (very 
bad; very sad; very discontent; very tense) to 3 (very good; very happy; very content; 
very relaxed).  On completion, participants were thanked and debriefed.   
Results 
Manipulation Check 
Participants responded to the same manipulation check employed in Study 2.  
Participants in the powerful condition felt more in charge of the situation than did 
participants in the powerless condition (Ms = 7.20 vs. 2.74), t(60) = 11.88, p < .001, d 
= 3.07, indicating that the priming manipulation was successful.  
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Task Completion Time 
Attentional Focus.  Answers given to the four scenarios were transformed into 
continuous measures (i.e. days or min), standardized, and then collapsed into a single 
score of predicted task completion time (α = .44).4 This score was subjected to a 2 
(power: powerful vs. powerless) x 2 (attentional focus: past vs. control) between-
subjects analysis of variance.  The analysis yielded the predicted interaction between 
attentional focus and power, F(1, 60) = 4.01,  p = .050, ηp2 = .06 (see Table 3).  An 
examination of simple effects confirmed that, in the control condition, powerful 
participants predicted on average shorter completion times than powerless participants 
(Ms = -.31 vs. .14), t(60) = 2.21, p = .031, d = .57.  Paralleling the findings of the 
previous studies, power led to more optimistic time predictions.  Importantly, when 
participants’ attention was drawn to previous experiences, the predictions of 
participants primed with power no longer differed from the predictions of participants 
primed with powerlessness (Ms = .14 vs. -.05), t(60) < 1.  Planned contrasts 
confirmed that drawing attention to relevant past experiences rendered the predictions 
of participants primed with power less optimistic (t(60) = -2.05, p = .045, d = .53), but 
it did not affect the predictions of participants primed with powerlessness, t(60) < 1.  
No other significant effects emerged, Fs < 1.  These results lend support to the 
assumption that differences in attentional focus underlie the effects of power on time 
predictions. 
Mood.  There was a marginal tendency for participants primed with power to 
report being in a better mood than participants primed with powerlessness (Ms = .65 
vs. .16), t(60) = -1.81, p = .075, d = .47.  Nevertheless, inclusion of mood as a 
covariate in the analysis of variance described above did not alter the effects of 
power; the interaction between attentional focus and power remained unchanged (F(1, 
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57) = 4.61, p = .036), and differences in mood did not account for any variance in 
time predictions, F < 1.  These results indicate that the effects of power were 
unrelated to differences in mood.   
Retrospective Time Estimates.  If power affected time predictions by altering 
the ways participants allocated attention in the planning of the future, then one would 
expect no difference in the retrospective time estimates of powerful and powerless 
participants. To confirm this supposition, we created a composite index of past 
completion time (α = .56), which did not differ between powerful and powerless 
participants (Ms = .12 vs. -.16), t(32) = 1.25, p = .220.  We also examined the 
correlations between past and future completion times.  As expected, this correlation 
was very high (r(32) = .93, p < .001) and did not differ as a function of power, z < 1.  
These results support the conclusion that power affected time estimates through its 
effects on future planning behavior.  
The findings of Study 3 support the hypothesis that power affects goal-
directed attention in ways that induce optimistic predictions of task completion time.  
Similar to the previous studies, participants primed with power predicted shorter 
completion times than participants primed with powerlessness.  Drawing participants’ 
attention to relevant information that lies outside the focal goal (here: past 
experiences) eliminated the effects of power on time predictions.  The manipulation 
of attentional focus only affected powerful, but not powerless participants.  Moreover, 
power only led to differences in future time estimates, but it did not affect time 
estimate for the past.  These results are consistent with a causal role of attentional 
focus in promoting greater bias in powerful individuals’ forecasts.   
We conducted a subsequent study to establish the generalizability of our 
findings.  To this end, we examined individual differences in power within a larger 
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survey that was conducted over the course of an academic term.  The study also 
explored further underlying mechanisms of the effects of power.  As noted earlier, a 
greater bias in the time predictions of powerful individuals could also arise from 
differences in optimism.  Powerful individuals might dismiss debiasing information 
because they are generally more optimistic about the future (Anderson & Galinsky, 
2006).  Our next study examined the role of optimism in the present findings. We also 
included measures of self-efficacy and mood to see if these variables contributed to 
the effects of power in the context of the field survey. 
Study 4 
In the present study, students estimated the time it will take them to complete 
a coursework assignment, and estimates were compared against actual completion 
time, paralleling the procedure of Study 1.  Unlike Study 1, the present study followed 
an individual difference approach and participants indicated how much power they 
experienced in their everyday relationships with other people (Anderson, John, & 
Keltner, 2005; cited in Anderson & Galinsky, 2006).  This measure of sense of power 
was embedded in a university-wide survey.  The survey was carried out towards the 
beginning (time 1) and the end (time 2) of the academic term.  We reasoned that if 
individual differences in power predict bias in time estimates in this diverse sample, 
and over a prolonged period of time, then this would be a strong indicator for the 
generalizability of our findings.   
Another goal of the present study was to examine different underlying 
mechanisms for the effects of power.  Specifically, we included a measure of 
optimism to see if the greater optimism typically observed in powerful individuals 
contributes to the greater bias in powerful individuals’ forecasts.  As in Study 3, we 
assessed mood to see if power promoted more optimistic estimates because power can 
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elevate people’s mood (Keltner et al., 2003).  Lastly, as in Study 2, we measured self-
efficacy to examine whether power leads to greater bias in time estimates in part 
because powerful individuals have greater confidence in their abilities.   
Method 
Participants and Design 
Four-hundred and twenty-one students (270 females and 151 males) from the 
University of Kent participated in the first part of this correlational study (time 1).  
Lottery tickets for a £50 (~ $70) cash-prize draw were offered in return for 
participation.  Two-hundred and forty-nine students (165 females and 84 males) 
completed the second part of the study (time 2).   Participants were enrolled in various 
degrees across more than twelve subject areas; 83% studied at undergraduate level 
and 17% pursued graduate studies.   
Procedure and Materials 
Towards the beginning of the academic term (time 1), an email was distributed 
university-wide, inviting students to participate in an online study on individual 
differences and student-life perception.  The web-based survey asked participants to 
specify a written coursework assignment that they had to submit by the end of the 
academic term, as well as the exact deadline for their assignment (week, day, hours).  
Next, participants made a number of time predictions for different tasks required to 
complete their assignment.  They indicated when they were going to start reading for 
their assignment, when they were going to start writing, when they were going to 
finish writing, and when they were going to submit their assignment.  Participants 
were given the opportunity not to respond if a task did not apply to their particular 
assignment.   
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The survey also employed a number of individual difference measures.  Eight 
items assessed how much power participants had in their everyday relationships with 
other people (Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2005).  Example items include ‘In my 
relationship with others, I can get people to listen to what I say’, or ‘I can get others 
to do what I want’ (1=disagree strongly, 7=agree strongly).  Furthermore, a ten-item 
scale measured participants’ degree of optimism (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 
1994).  Example items include ‘In uncertain times, I usually expect the best’, or ‘I 
rarely count on good things happening to me’ (reverse coded) (1=disagree a lot, 
5=agree a lot).  A ten-item scale assessed participants’ self-efficacy beliefs 
(Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995).  Example items are ‘I am certain that I can 
accomplish my goals’, or ‘I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try 
hard enough’ (1=not at all true, 4=exactly true).  Finally, a four-item scale measured 
participants’ mood (-3=very bad, very sad, very discontent, very tense; 3=very good, 
very happy, very content, very relaxed).  Participants also indicated their academic 
and demographic background, and at the end they described what they thought were 
the aims of the study.   
At time 2, an invitation for a follow-up survey was sent to participants’ email-
addresses, typically within 2 weeks after their assignment had been due.  Participants 
were reminded of the nature of their assignment.  They then indicated when they had 
completed each of the four tasks (i.e., start reading, start writing, finish writing, 
submission) using the same items employed at time 1.  At the end, participants were 
probed for suspicion and debriefed.  Background information was sent to all 
participants enrolled in the study.   
Results 
Data Preparation  
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For unknown reasons, 39 participants made predictions for past assignments, 
or assignments that were due shortly after (<2 weeks) time 1.  Moreover, four 
participants expressed an intention to submit their assignments more than one week 
past the deadline.  These participants were omitted from subsequent analyses.5  The 
final sample consisted of 206 participants.   
We only considered time estimates for future tasks.  For example, if 
participants had already begun reading for their assignment at time 1, then their time 
estimates for this task (start reading) were not considered.  This procedure resulted in 
the omission of 16.8% of all temporal data (i.e., predicted and actual completion 
time).  In addition, 1.2% of the temporal data was discarded because of missing time 1 
or time 2 comparators.   
We coded predicted and actual task completion time in number of days 
before the deadline, separately for each of the four tasks.  Higher values indicate 
earlier completion times.  Table 4 displays descriptive statistics for these data.  On 
average, participants completed all four tasks later than predicted.  This difference 
was significant for all but one task (‘start reading’).   Next, we created single indices 
for all variables in preparation for subsequent regression analyses.6  We standardized 
participants’ time 1 predictions for the four tasks and averaged those scores into a 
single index of predicted task completion time (α = .81, M =  .04, SD = .87).  A single 
index of actual task completion time was created in the same way for the time 2 data 
(α = .85, M =  -.02, SD = .90).  We also subtracted the actual from the predicted 
completion times, separately for each of the four tasks to create indices of temporal 
bias.  This was done using the unstandardized raw data.  The difference scores were 
then standardized and merged into a single index of biased time predictions (α = .86, 
M =  .05, SD = .89).  Higher values indicate greater underestimates of task completion 
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time.  Lastly, we averaged the individual differences measures into single indices of 
sense of power (α = .84, M = 4.66, SD = .88), self-efficacy (α = .86, M = 3.00, SD = 
.44), optimism (α = .80, M = 3.26, SD = .78), and mood (α = .81, M = .67, SD = 1.16).  
Reverse coded items were recoded prior to data aggregation.   
Task Completion Time 
Sense of Power.  Table 5 displays the zero-order correlations between all 
indices derived from the present study.  As can be seen, sense of power was positively 
related to predicted task completion time, r(204) = .20, p = .005.  Paralleling the 
findings of the previous studies, the greater participants’ sense of power, the earlier 
participants anticipated completing their assignments.  Differences in power did not 
relate to differences in actual completion time, r(204) = -.03, p = .667.  Most 
importantly, power was associated with an increased bias in participants’ forecasts, 
r(204) = .21, p = .003.  The greater participants’ sense of power, the more participants 
underestimated the time it would take them to complete their assignment. 
Mediating Variables.  Sense of power was positively related to optimism, self-
efficacy, and mood  (see Table 5), rs(204) ≥ .19, ps ≤ .008.  To see if any of these 
variables contributed to the effects of power, we conducted a series of regression 
analyses in which we entered sense of power and the control measures as predictors of 
predicted task completion time, and as predictors of bias.  Controlling for the effects 
of optimism, sense of power exerted a significant effect on predicted task completion 
time (β = .17, p = .023), and on bias (β= .22, p = .004).  Similarly, controlling for the 
effects of self-efficacy, the effects of power remained significant (predicted task 
completion time: β = .18, p = .019; bias: β = .15, p = .044).  The same picture 
emerged when we controlled for differences in mood (predicted task completion time: 
β = .17, p = .013; bias: β = .18, p = .009).  Lastly, when all control measures were 
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entered simultaneously in multiple regression, power emerged as the only significant 
(p<.05) predictor (predicted task completion time: β = .16, p = .036; bias: β = .16, p = 
.035).   Additional Sobel tests revealed that there were no indirect effects of sense of 
power on predicted task completion time, or on bias via any of the control measures 
(optimism: ZSobels ≤ 1.14, ps  ≥ .253; self-efficacy: ZSobels ≤ 1.59, ps  ≥ .110; mood: 
ZSobels ≤ 1.57, ps  ≥ .116).  Together, these results indicate that power affected time 
estimates independently of optimism, self-efficacy, and mood.7 
Additional Analyses 
 Gender.  The larger sample size of Study 4 allowed us to explore the role of 
gender differences.  Independent sample t-tests revealed that gender was unrelated to 
predicted and actual task completion times, and it did not account for any variance in 
bias, ts(204) < 1.  Inclusion of gender in the above described multiple regression 
analyses did not alter the effects of sense of power (predicted task completion time: β 
= .20, p = .004; bias: β = .21, p = .003).  Additional moderated multiple regression 
analyses following the procedure outlined by Aiken and West (1991) confirmed that 
gender did not moderate the effects of sense of power, ps ≥ .159.  Taken together, 
gender did not contribute to the present findings.  
Task complexity.  To examine whether power affected time predictions 
independently of task content, we also explored the role of task complexity.  Two 
independent coders rated the complexity of the assignments described by participants 
at time 1 on a five-point scale (1=not at all, 5=very much).  The ratings were highly 
correlated and averaged into a single score (α = .81, M = 3.19, SD = .73).  We then 
conducted two separate moderated regression analyses, using the standardized 
complexity ratings, the sense of power scores, as well as the interaction term of those 
two variables as predictors of predicted task completion time, and as predictors of bias 
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(see Aiken & West, 1991).  Only sense of power emerged as a significant predictor 
from these analyses (predicted task completion time: β = .20, p = .004; bias: β = .21, p 
= .003), and none of the effects involving task complexity were significant,  ps ≥ .156.  
This suggests that power affected time predictions irrespectively of task complexity. 
 Focusing on individual differences in power, Study 4 provided further 
evidence for the hypothesis that power biases time predictions.  A university-wide 
survey found that the more students experienced a sense of power in their everyday 
relationships with others, the earlier they anticipated completing a future assignment, 
and the more their time predictions were prone to error.    
Study 4 also explored the contributions of a number of factors to the effects of 
power.  Consistent with past research on time planning (Buehler & Griffin, 2003; 
Jørgensen & Faugli, 2006), no support was found for the role of optimism in 
promoting greater error in the forecasts of powerful individuals.  Corroborating the 
findings of Studies 2 and 3, the effects of power were independent from differences in 
self-efficacy and from differences in mood.  Contributing to the generalizability of the 
present findings, the effects of power emerged outside the laboratory in a diverse 
sample, over a prolonged period of time, and across a range of tasks.  
General Discussion 
People tend to underestimate the time it takes them to accomplish future tasks.  
This bias in time predictions originates from the way people allocate attention in the 
planning of future events.  Specifically, people tend to focus too narrowly on the 
intended outcome and tend to neglect additional information that could make 
predictions more accurate and less biased (i.e., impediments, previous experiences, 
and task subcomponents).  In the present article, we tested the hypothesis that power 
increases biases in predictions of task completion time.  This hypothesis derived from 
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previous research showing that power induces a goal-directed attention focus 
(Guinote, 2007a, 2007c).  
Four studies tested, and found support for these hypotheses.  Across different 
domains, involving the planning of academic work (Studies 1 and 4), computerized 
tasks (Study 2), and everyday activities (Study 3), powerful participants, more than 
control (Study 1) or powerless participants (Studies 2-4), consistently underestimated 
the time it would take them to complete future tasks.  This pattern was observed using 
a variety of operationalizations of power, ranging from actual control over outcomes 
(Study 1), to priming power and powerlessness (Studies 2 and 3), and measuring 
individual differences in sense of power (Study 4).  Together, these studies show for 
the first time that power has a fundamental impact on planning behavior, increasing 
biases in time estimates.  These findings are important because the planning of 
powerful individuals has wide-ranging implications for individual, organizational, and 
societal outcomes.   
Across the four studies, we examined several factors that are of relevance to 
the link between power and underestimates of time.  We did not find evidence that 
power leads to greater bias in time predictions because powerful people are more 
optimistic; consistent with previous research on time planning (see Buehler & Griffin, 
2003; Jørgensen & Faugli, 2006).  Likewise, the effects of power could not be 
attributed to differences in people’s beliefs in their abilities (i.e., self-efficacy), or to 
differences in mood.    
Consistent with previous research on time predictions (e.g., Buehler & Griffin, 
2003; Buehler et al., 2002; Newby-Clark et al., 2000; Kruger & Evans, 2004), Study 3 
found support for the role of attentional focus as an underlying mechanism for the 
effects of power.  In this study, drawing participants’ attention to relevant information 
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that lies outside the focal goal eliminated the otherwise observed differences in the 
time predictions of powerful and powerless individuals.  This lends support to the 
assumption that the effects of power on time predictions derive from the way power 
affects the allocation of attention in the planning of future events.  
Some caveats of the present research should be addressed.  First, none of our 
studies manipulated powerlessness together with a baseline condition.  The present 
research is, therefore, not conclusive as to whether lacking power reduces the 
tendency to underestimate time.  Lack of power broadens individuals’ attentional 
focus (Guinote, 2007b) and lessens motivational states associated with approach 
(Keltner et al., 2003; Smith & Bargh, 2008).  By the same token that high power 
increases bias in time predictions we believe that low power should reduce the 
tendency to underestimate time.  Tentative support for this assertion derives from 
Study 3, which found a linear increase in bias moving from low levels of experienced 
power to high levels of power.    
Second, while previous research has shown that power facilitates action 
(Galinsky et al., 2003) and leads to swifter goal-attainment (Guinote, 2007c), the 
current work provided only mixed evidence for such effects.  Power benefited goal 
striving in Study 1, but it did not lead to faster goal-attainment in Studies 2 and 4.  
Different factors could account for the variability in the findings.  The formatting task 
in Study 2 was repetitive and not very demanding on executive functions (e.g., 
prioritization, cognitive flexibility), which could have minimized the benefits of 
power for goal pursuit.  In Study 4, participants had to deal with a multitude of goals 
that typically arise throughout the course of an academic term.  Power might have led 
to greater efficiency in the pursuit of other, more immediate goals that were not 
Power and Time Predictions  30 
 
assessed in the study (e.g., other assignments, social goals), which could explain the 
discrepancy between past research and the present findings.  
Finally, only one study provided direct evidence for the role of attentional 
focus in contributing to the effects of power.  More research is needed to further 
investigate how attentional focus operates to promote differences in the time 
predictions of powerful and powerless people.  For instance, it would be important to 
establish which sources of information are neglected by powerful individuals that 
render their time estimates less accurate.  This information might vary between tasks 
and contexts.  For example, the tendency to neglect previous experiences might be 
more influential in promoting bias in the predictions of mundane activities (Study 3), 
while the tendency to neglect detailed aspects of a task might carry greater weight in 
promoting bias in a novel formatting task (Study 2).  
Power affects how people conceive information that lies in the focus of 
attention.  Specifically, power fosters abstraction (Smith & Trope, 2006; see also 
Guinote et al., 2002), leading powerful individuals to construe information at a 
higher-level of information processing (cf. Semin & Fiedler, 1988; Trope & 
Liberman, 2003; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987).  One question that arises is what role 
abstraction plays in the present findings.  When people construe tasks in abstract 
terms they tend to focus more on the desirability of end-states and less on the 
feasibility of reaching those end-states (Liberman & Trope, 1998).  By drawing 
individuals’ attention to task outcomes and away from task subcomponents, 
abstraction can contribute to increase biases in time predictions (cf. Kruger & Evans, 
2004).  
At the same time, abstraction can also contribute to reduce biases in time 
predictions.  It has been shown that when people form concrete plans about the future 
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they are more prone to bias in their forecasts (Buehler & Griffin, 2003).  One reason 
why this tends to be the case is that events that are construed at a concrete level are 
perceived as more atypical and unique (e.g., Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002; 
Smith, 1998).  Conversely, events that are construed at a more abstract level are 
perceived as more prototypical and common.  As a result, abstraction counteracts the 
‘inside view’ and increases the likelihood that people will consider past experiences in 
their forecasts (cf. Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993). Taken together, abstraction may be a 
double-edged sword and may have opposing effects on the tendency of powerful 
individuals to underestimate time.    
It is important to note that we only examined time predictions for tasks that 
were unrelated to the exercise of power.  Previous research on time planning has 
shown that the greater individuals’ motivation to accomplish a goal, the more people 
tend to be biased in their forecasts (Buehler, Griffin, & MacDonald, 1997; Byram, 
1997).  One might well expect that power fosters even greater bias in forecasts when 
the stakes are high. Indeed, some of the historic mistakes in time planning occurred 
when those in charge were under pressure to succeed (Hall, 1980; Schnaars, 1989).  
Empirical research is required to establish how power affects time estimates for tasks 
that are relevant to the maintenance, or to the furtherance of people’s power.  
Lovallo and Kahneman (2003) pointed out that the same mechanisms that 
make people prone to underestimate time also increase the likelihood that individuals 
take unwarranted risks. The present findings thus complement past research that has 
shown that power promotes more optimistic risk-assessment (Anderson & Galinsky, 
2006).  The planning behavior of powerful individuals could be another factor that 
contributes to the propensity of powerful individuals to take risks.  
Contributions  
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The present research contributes to the literature on time predictions by 
showing that one’s position in a social hierarchy can alleviate or strengthen biases in 
forecasts.  Previous research has focused primarily on the role of situational variables 
(e.g., incentives, see Buehler et al., 1997) and particularities of the task (e.g., duration, 
see Roy, Christenfeld, & McKenzie, 2005) as determinants of temporal biases.  As the 
present findings show, the extent to which people control their own and other 
individuals’ outcomes affects time estimates.    
There has been a recent accumulation of evidence suggesting that power leads 
to greater efficiency in a number of domains, including decision making (e.g, Smith, 
Dijksterhuis, & Wigboldus, 2008), goal pursuit (e.g., Guinote, 2007c), and general 
cognitive functioning (e.g., Guinote, 2007b; Smith, Jostmann, Galinsky, & van Dijk, 
2008).  The present findings are important because they show that power does not 
always have beneficial effects; it can be detrimental for planning and lead to greater 
errors in forecasts. 
The present findings have significant applied value as they point out that those 
who are typically in charge of planning (e.g., managers; decision and policy makers) 
are more at risk to fall prey to biases in their forecasts.  This is not only important 
because of the economic costs associated with inaccurate time estimates (e.g., Buehler 
et al., 1994); overly ambitious time scales can put employees under pressure, induce 
stress, and contribute to overtime work (see Sparks, Cooper, Fried, & Shirom, 1997; 
Burchell, Ladipo, & Wilkinson, 2001).  In this view, biases in time predictions of 
decision makers could have significant adverse effects on the well-being and general 
quality of life of employees.  Future research should address these broader 
implications of the present findings.   
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Notably, the present research also points out ways to alleviate the biasing 
effects of power.  Specifically, Study 3 suggests that forecasting accuracy could be 
improved by using techniques that draw people’s attention to information that lies 
outside the focal goal.  Moreover, changing the power structure of planning 
committees could also be a way to render forecasts more accurate (e.g., by assigning 
greater weight to the predictions of individuals who do not have power).  It remains 
for future research to explore the applications of the present findings for the 
prevention of human biases in forecasts. 
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Footnotes 
1 See Maibach & Murphy (1995) for a single judgment approach to measure 
self-efficacy.   
2 The self-efficacy scores were normally distributed and centered on the 
midpoint of the scale, M = 5.42, SD = 2.20, Z Kolmogorov-Smirnov = .80, p = .541.   
3 The response alternatives were chosen based on a pre-test with students (N = 
42) who had responded in an open-ended format to the four scenarios. 
4 The effects reported in Study 3 did not differ reliably between the four 
scenarios. 
5
 Natural breaks in the data supported the decision on the cut-off points for 
excluding participants.  Retention of all participants did not significantly alter the 
results. 
6 In Study 4 we chose multiple regression as the data analytic strategy due to 
the continuous nature of the independent variables (e.g., Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen 
& Cohen, 1983).  All other studies employed the general linear model (GLM) 
procedure, which yields equivalent results as multiple regression analyses.   
7
 Interestingly, the analyses also showed that sense of power mediated the 
effects of self-efficacy on temporal bias.  When controlling for power, the effects of 
self-efficacy were no longer significant (β = .12, p = .106), and there was a reliable 
indirect effect of self-efficacy via power, ZSobel = 1.95, p = .051.  One interpretation of 
the overall pattern of the results is that elevated self-efficacy beliefs were a 
consequence, but not an antecedent of the greater goal-focus of powerful individuals. 
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Table 1 
Predicted and actual completion times of written assignment (Study 1) 
 
  Task completion time   
 Predicted Actual   
Task M SD M SD t Df 
First Draft 6.50a 2.57 3.60a 1.60 9.45*** 19 
Final Draft 4.00b 1.69 1.55b 1.00 9.20*** 19 
Submission .95c .76 .50c .51 2.13* 19 
Note. * = p < .05, *** = p < .001. Means display number of days before a designated 
deadline. Means with differing subscripts within columns are significantly different, p 
< .001. 
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Table 2  
Actual and predicted completion times as a function of condition (Studies 1-2) 
 Task completion time 
 Predicted Actual 
 M SD M SD 
Study 1a     
Powerful 4.93 1.33 2.47 .71 
Control 2.70 .66 1.30 .60 
Study 2b     
Powerful 3.95 1.27 8.91 1.28 
Powerless 6.32 1.80 9.13 2.51 
a
 Scores indicate number of days before a deadline 
b
 Completion time of formatting task in minutes  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Power and Time Predictions  44 
 
Table 3  
Predicted task completion time as a function of experimental condition (Study 3) 
 Powerful Powerless 
Focus M SD M SD 
Control condition -.31 .39 .14 .70 
Past focus .14 .80 -.05 .57 
Note. Scores are z-standardized time estimates for a series of tasks 
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Table 4 
Predicted and actual completion times of written assignment (Study 4) 
 
  Task completion time   
 Predicted Actual   
Task M SD M SD t Df 
Start Reading 31.01a 16.95 27.85a 26.04 1.49 97 
Start Writing 26.21b 17.63 17.40b 19.45 6.41*** 159 
Finish Writing 8.96c 14.07 3.81c 15.98 5.00*** 188 
Submission 3.33d 9.16 -.83d 14.54 4.24*** 205 
Note. *** = p < .001. Means display number of days before a designated deadline. 
Means with differing subscripts within columns are significantly different, p < .001. 
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Table 5 
 
Zero-order correlations between individual difference measures and predicted and actual completion time (Study 4) 
 
  Individual Difference Measures (t1)   Task completion time 
  Optimism  Self-Efficacy Mood   Predicted Actual Difference (Bias) 
Sense of Power 
.345*** .436*** .185**      .196** -.030     .207** 
Optimism 
 .484*** . 388***     .142*  .070 .050 
Self-Efficacy 
  .257***   .114 -.078     .190** 
Mood  
 
 
      .155* -.022   .158* 
Note. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001. N = 206 for all analyses. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Example of formatting task used in Study 2. 
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